It was prompted at the time by yet another story of mainline denominational decline, even as that same denomination was engaging in a favorite mainline exercise: rearranging its theological, liturgical, or organizational deck chairs. In this case the subject was Christian conservatives’ favorite denominational whipping boy, The Episcopal Church USA. This American expression of the Church of England is, of course, the epitome of cultural religious self-importance. As a result, its numerical decline and internal divisions have made it an easy target and the object of more than a little schadenfreude among Christian conservatives.
Theology has never been Anglicanism’s forte, so while its attempts to reshape itself for the modern world have been sincere and determined, they have often been flat-footed. Thus, Douthat’s critical summery is not so far off. The denomination's changes, he writes, have left it
flexible to the point of indifference on dogma, friendly to sexual
liberation in almost every form, willing to blend Christianity with other
faiths, and eager to downplay theology entirely in favor of secular political
causes. Yet instead of attracting a younger, more open-minded demographic with
these changes, the Episcopal Church’s dying has proceeded apace. Last week,
while the church’s House of Bishops was approving a rite to bless same-sex
unions, Episcopalian church attendance figures for 2000-10 circulated in the
religion blogosphere. They showed something between a decline and a collapse:
In the last decade, average Sunday attendance dropped 23 percent, and not a single
Episcopal diocese in the country saw churchgoing increase.
As Douthat goes on to point out, this is
not a unique experience for Episcopalians. “Practically every denomination —
Methodist, Lutheran, Presbyterian — that has tried to adapt itself to contemporary
liberal values has seen an Episcopal-style plunge in church attendance.”
Douthat does not write off liberal
Christianity, however. He is well aware of the valuable role it
has played in promoting social justice. He is also aware that the conservative
Christianity that has risen during liberalism’s decline has often been “theologically
shallow, preaching a gospel of health and wealth rather than the full New
Testament message.”
Thus, rather than wishing its demise
Douthat hopes “that
liberal Christianity recovers a religious reason for its own existence.” Amidst
their attempts to modernize their denominations, liberal church leaders need to
“consider not just what they would change about historic Christianity, but what
they would defend and offer uncompromisingly to the world.”
The decades-long numerical decline of
liberal or “mainline” denominations is indisputable. The causes, however, are
not nearly as simple or clear as Douthat would have us believe. Membership in
these churches peaked in the late 1960s and early 70s. If there was an
ideological trigger for their decline at this time, however, it was a reaction
against the social and political involvement Douthat seems to champion. Most of
the theological change came later, at least partly in response to membership
loses already evident.
Recent declines within American
Christianity have also never been restricted to so-called liberal churches. For
example, the decline of moderate and liberal Lutheran churches has been matched by the shrinking of the much more conservative Lutheran
Church—Missouri Synod. It is widely recognized that overall Roman Catholic
membership would have declined had it not been for Hispanic immigration.
Recently, more traditional conservative denominations like the Southern Baptist
Convention have been reporting flat or even moderately declining memberships.
Then there is the ambiguity of the
liberal-conservative distinction. As Douthat says, many successful conservative
churches have embraced the so-called “prosperity gospel” which often downplays
or avoids much traditional Christian teaching and doctrine. Thus, Joel Osteen’s
preaching packs a former NBA arena in Houston and draws a global TV audience in the
millions, yet many of his strongest critics are conservative Christians because
he avoids taking firm positions on many of their litmus test social and
theological issues. On the other hand Robert Schuler, a prosperity gospel
pioneer, has lived to see his church empire collapse into internal acrimony and
bankruptcy.
Conservative churches, also, have not
been above conveniently adapting to social change. As divorce rates climbed and
became socially acceptable, it quietly disappeared as one of the favorite
topics of hell-fire preaching—especially when the preacher himself was
divorced.
There is growing evidence that
conservative churches are finding themselves behind the curve in another area
of rapid social change: acceptance of homosexuality. As gays and lesbians have
become increasingly open about their sexual orientation, like everyone else
conservative Christians are finding themselves with growing numbers of gay
friends, co-workers, and family members. Many are finding it difficult to
accept their church's judgment of people they personally know and like. Many younger
evangelicals are challenging their congregations and denominations to change
their theology and policies and the voices of some elder leaders are beginning
to join them.
The changes in American Christianity
over the past forty years have caused much head scratching among both church
leaders and more disinterested academic observers. While there is still no
agreement about what is going on, simplistic and argumentative explanations
like those of Ross Douthat have been generally dismissed. Instead, from the
duration and depth of the change, from the research I have seen, and from my
own lifelong experience within mainline Christianity, I would say that the
decline of American Christianity is more about sociological and demographic
change than unfaithfulness or failure of church leadership.
Because church issues so easily
become contentious it’s easy to lose sight of the basic reality: more people
are leaving churches and fewer people are joining churches. There are a number
of factors almost certainly involved. There is evidence that singles and
couples without children have less interest in belonging to a church and that segment of the population been growing. Until just recently, our population has been
increasingly mobile, inevitably resulting in more fluid church membership
roles. New research shows that people in personal or economic distress are
actually less likely to be a part of church communities, probably because of
the difficulty of maintaining relationships based at least in part on previous
states of being (marriage, employment, etc.). Whatever religious needs they
meet, churches also fulfilled important past social functions (finding friends, spouses, employment, etc.) which many people
no longer need or are meeting in other ways.
All of these sociological issues
circle around the more fundamental question which Douthat points to at the end:
do people still have a religious need that liberal churches can meet? For a
growing number the answer seems to be no. In fact, this has probably been true
for longer than we realize but successfully meeting people’s social needs kept
churches from realizing it. Now that has changed and such churches’ pews are
increasingly empty and remaining members increasingly elderly.
The reality is that liberal/mainline
churches stopped believing their own founding religious story a century or more
ago. It is what religious modernism and liberalism have been about.
Intellectual developments since the Enlightenment have led the church to
realize Christianity didn’t fall from heaven fully formed but has a history
like every other human endeavor. Its discovery of other religions made it aware
that many of its ideas are not unique or very original. Scientific knowledge has made
impossible almost any literal understanding of basic Christian teaching.
Preachers can no longer speak coherently about heaven or hell, judgment and
salvation, or an after-life. Church members’ conceptions of God now have little
to do with traditional biblical views or theological teaching. More often they
are of a vague, guiding and comforting, "presence" of almost embarrassingly childlike
quality. Few Christians can state even basic orthodox church teaching, let
alone confess it.
Recently I left my congregation to move out-of-state. Thus, I am temporarily “unchurched” and have visited the two local ELCA Lutheran congregations of my denomination. One is moderate sized, with a middle age and older congregation. The other is small, somewhat younger, but can support only a part-time pastor. Neither congregation could be described as thriving; both are smaller than they once were.
Recently I left my congregation to move out-of-state. Thus, I am temporarily “unchurched” and have visited the two local ELCA Lutheran congregations of my denomination. One is moderate sized, with a middle age and older congregation. The other is small, somewhat younger, but can support only a part-time pastor. Neither congregation could be described as thriving; both are smaller than they once were.
At both congregations I was welcomed
warmly at each visit, sometimes almost uncomfortably so. Both used traditional
Lutheran liturgy with user-friendly, in-house produced booklets. Sermons (by
the parish pastors and guests) were fair and the hymn selection fair to poor.
In each instance I found myself wondering how a visiting non-Lutheran would
experience all this, what would draw them in in the first place, and what would
entice them to come back or join such an organization. Working a normal “9 to
5” job, I am very aware of the value of my limited free time and how choosy I am in
allocating it. How much time, if any, would I give to “church” and, if I did,
what would I get in return?
In the end, I think Douthat’s
challenge to mainline churches is actually the right one: what is the religious reason for their existence?
With most of their social functions gone, mediocre worship and preaching
centered on antiquated and/or nonsensical theology is often all that churches
have left. The “renovations” that Douthat decries have often been silly, and
certainly ineffective, because they only served to redecorate a theological
structure that actually needs rebuilding from the foundation.
The decline of liberal churches is
understandable and even appropriate as they have become organizations
functioning primarily to maintain themselves. While Douthat’s answer to this
crisis is the wrong one, his framing of the problem is correct. What is to be
the religious function of mainline churches? What remains to be seen is whether
awareness of the mainline crisis will ever lead these churches to realize they
have lost their reason for existing, and that if they don’t find a new purpose soon
they will become only the latest chapter of religious history.